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Compensation, Culture and Contracts: The 
Realities of the DoD’s Blended Workforce 
Kathy Loudin—Kathlyn Loudin has served on the Defense Acquisition University faculty since 
2008. Previously, she led an acclaimed group of cost engineers at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 
supporting Navy, Marine Corps, and other DoD programs. Loudin has acquisition experience within 
both the DoD and industry, holds an MPA, and is a PhD candidate at Virginia Tech. She has written 
for Contract Management, Defense Acquisition Review Journal, and Defense AT&L, and has 
presented at the Acquisition Research Symposium (2008), the American Society for Naval Engineers 
(2008), the Navy Cost Analysis Symposium (2009), and the DoD Cost Analysis Symposium (2010). 
Abstract  
The Obama Administration's March 2009 mandate that the federal government 
rebuild its organic acquisition workforce, coupled with the recent repeal of the National 
Security Personnel System (NSPS), opens the curtain for a fresh look at Department of 
Defense (DoD) human capital management practices, particularly for employees in critical 
acquisition positions. Common perceptions hold that the DoD, given its relatively weak 
ability to provide economic rewards, sacrifices much of its best talent to private-sector 
employers.  Driven in large part by this revolving door phenomenon, the DoD’s acquisition 
workforce now consists of a rich blend of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, who 
deliver many basic acquisition competencies.  
This study synthesizes three quantitative analyses of compensation packages 
available to military, civilian and contractor personnel, with qualitative research on the less-
tangible incentives offered in each sector, to explore the DoD’s competitive position in the 
recruitment and retention of high-caliber acquisition professionals.  It finds that, although 
high-performing DoD civilians are at slight financial disadvantage, they can be motivated to 
stay in organizations in which a positive, mission-focused ethos prevails.  
Background: The Pay-for-Performance Debate  
Several years ago, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 
(FY) 2004 amended Title 5 of the US Code, authorizing the Secretary of Defense to 
implement a new personnel system, known as National Security Personnel System (NSPS), 
to replace the long-standing General Schedule (GS) system.  Heralded as a human capital 
management system that could boost organizational effectiveness by paying employees for 
exemplary performance, NSPS was gradually deployed throughout most of the DoD.  Six 
years later, just as the later-adopting DoD organizations were pondering the results of their 
first NSPS review cycles, the FY 2010 NDAA further amended Title 5, effectively rolling back 
NSPS1 and instituting an improved version of the General Schedule (GS) system, one that 
                                                
1 The National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 (US Congress, 2010, HR 2647, Sect. 1113, pp. 








will eventually feature management flexibilities and workforce incentives crafted to attract 
and retain talented employees.   
Mere months before the repeal of NSPS, in March 2009, President Obama published 
a memorandum2 succinctly addressing the shortcomings of the government’s acquisition 
system and directing the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to work with Executive 
Agency and Department Heads to ensure both the capacity and the ability of their 
workforces to appropriately negotiate, manage and oversee acquisition programs. Within 
weeks, the DoD had constructed an action plan. This plan called for the addition of some 
20,000 acquisition positions by 2015.  Of this figure, approximately 11,000 would be 
converted from contractor positions to government positions; the other 9,000 would be new 
government positions (Hedgpath, 2009). 
Against this exciting but perplexing backdrop, the DoD must balance dramatic 
demands for experienced, talented personnel, while at the same time reinvigorating the GS 
system.  Some would argue that those two goals are in direct conflict: Many have pointed to 
the GS system as rewarding longevity (or time in service), rather than retaining the truly high 
performers.  In fact, the main indictment of the GS system was that it failed to motivate 
strong performance and that it levied few consequences for poor performance.  Given that 
public organizations strive to treat employees equitably, agencies cannot reward stellar 
performance much more handsomely then they reward mediocre performance.  According 
to James (2002), the GS system has traditionally supported internal equity, but not external 
(i.e., market-based) equity.  Other Office of Personnel Management (OPM) studies have 
found that 75% of pay increases have been unrelated to performance (Asch, 2005).  
Administration of pay-for-performance systems is not much easier for private-sector 
organizations, however.  Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) found that the highest-rated 
employees were only paid a few percentage points more than the lowest-rated employees.  
Lazear (2000) found a positive correlation only between compensation and time in service 
and/or hours worked—both objective, not performance-based, metrics.   
Recommendations for more effective personnel systems are plentiful:  Jamieson and 
O’Mara (1991) cited flexible rewards, incentive pay tied to both individual achievement and 
company profits, cash awards for patents and intrapreneurship, stock options, merchandise 
and travel incentives.  Branham (2001) suggested retention bonuses, project bonuses, 
selective stock options, and higher pay for hard-to-fill positions.  However, while the pursuit 
of more money is a socially acceptable reason for leaving an organization, Branham (2005) 
found that fewer than 12% of employees actually left for financial reasons.  Gellerman 
(1992) nodded at money as an inducement, but stressed its general inefficiency as a 
motivator.  Paraphrasing Maslowe (“Man does not live by bread alone, except when there is 
too little bread”), he argued that base pay is essential, but incentive pay motivates the 
extraordinary. 
The DoD’s current compensation conundrum seems custom-made for analysis via 
the principal-agent framework, which emanated from economic theory.  In basic terms, 
principal-agent theory posits that the employee or contractor (the “agent”) is rewarded for 
                                                
2 President Obama’s Memorandum on Government Contracting (March 4, 2009) is available at  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-






acting in ways consistent with the best interests of the employer (the “principal”).  If the 
agent’s needs are fulfilled, and the principal’s expectations are met, then the relationship will 
endure (Miller & Whitford, 2007).  Miller and Whitford also identified a problem dubbed "the 
principal's moral hazard constraint," in which bonuses large enough to produce desired 
behaviors were cost-prohibitive for the principal.  Consistent with much work in this area, I 
will focus on striking optimal contract(s) among players.  Rather than advocate an “either-or” 
arrangement—i.e., either a behavior-based (base pay) or an outcome-based (incentive pay) 
contract—I acknowledge the complexity of contracts, both in the real-world sense and in the 
metaphorical sense.  Contracts fall onto a continuum of arrangements, appropriately 
balancing risks and rewards over time.  This lends itself to multiple theoretical lenses for 
analysis.  For instance, studies contemplating risks and rewards associated with (fixed) 
salary versus (variable) commission packages (Eisenhardt, 1985; 1988; Conlon & Parks, 
1988) have augmented principal-agent theory with institutional theory, which addresses the 
whole hierarchy of human needs.  Duncan (2001) leveraged agency theory, alongside 
equity theory and reinforcement theory, to argue for broad-based incentive stock option 
plans, because they uphold ownership as a strong source of motivation. Likewise, Blair and 
Kruse (1999) heralded the rise of employees as an important shareholder group over the 
past 20 years, embracing employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and defined-
contribution pension plans, such as 401(k) plans. Wilson (1994) advocated the sharing of 
rewards, as well, tied to collaboration and teamwork.  In addition to the tangible rewards 
outlined above, compensation structures can also feature intangible or aspirational rewards.  
Promotional opportunities and career-path options, for example, are often offered along with 
fixed and variable pay.   
Indeed, to create enduring work arrangements, one must not draw solely from 
economics (a la Hirsch, Michaels & Friedman, 1987).  Social relationships are important, as 
well.  Throughout this paper, I will explore embeddedness theory (Granovetter, 1985), which 
supports the notion of letting managers create a positive climate through pleasing others 
and generally doing the right thing, thereby serving as role models for the suppression of 
“force and fraud.” The workplace can provide both economic and social incentives for 
trustworthiness.  Such acculturation is an ongoing process, created and calibrated through 
action in interpersonal networks.   
The Blended Workforce  
Bringing ever-more complexity to the stage, the phenomenon of the multi-sector, 
blended workforce has emerged. Contractors, civilians and military personnel are now found 
working shoulder to shoulder in pursuit of common goals.  In a recent study by the 
Government Accountability Office (2009) of 66 large program offices throughout the DoD, 
some 37% of their acquisition workforce members were support contractors.  Within the 
Missile Defense Agency and joint program offices, the percentage of contractors was higher: 
49% and 47%, respectively.  Certainly, from an everyday, operational standpoint, the 
delineations between “public” and “private” employment have blurred.  To understand the 
nuances of managing in today’s complicated blend of mixed allegiances, I decided to 
conduct a two-part study, balancing  the quantitative with the qualitative, and meshing 





Review of the Literature  
For decades, researchers—most notably those from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), charged with Federal Pay Comparability studies—have attempted to compare public 
and private-sector compensation.  Results have been mixed; critiques of various 
methodologies have abounded.  Many have portrayed comparisons of public and private-
sector employees as unfair, given the vastly different missions at issue.  Bozeman (1987) 
argued that because politics infiltrate nearly all organizational behaviors and processes, they 
are all “public” to some extent.    While government and industry differ in their goals, they 
employ similar mechanisms (a generic set of management functions) in pursuit of those 
objectives.  Allison (1980) concurred that management processes were basically alike, but 
that the importance of the means (i.e., functions) was eclipsed by the ends (i.e., different 
missions).  Hinting at the “revolving door” phenomenon, Allison cited several high-profile 
executives3 who had performed both public- and private-sector jobs, sharing unanimous 
sentiment that public management was more difficult. 
The difficulties of public management notwithstanding, many practitioners bemoan 
the relatively low compensation associated with public-sector work.  The salary, per se, may 
not be the problem.  In fact, Borjas (2002) found that male federal workers earned more 
than private-sector males with similar experience.  The problem is the tight distribution of 
earnings among public-sector workers:  Civil servants performing the roles of greatest 
responsibility do not earn substantially more than those in less-critical roles.  Borjas (2002), 
Gibbs (2001), and Katz and Krueger (1991) all argued that the compressed distribution of 
earnings among those in the federal government (relative to the broader possibilities in the 
private sector) will likely hinder the government’s future ability to recruit and retain highly 
talented personnel.  As many have pointed out, the best employees will always be 
underpaid; the mediocre will always be overpaid.  
Quantitative Analysis: The Surveys 
To better assess the DoD’s competitive position with respect to compensation, I 
collected recent salary data from three professional associations: The National Contract 
Management Association (NCMA), the Society for Cost Estimating and Analysis (SCEA), 
and the Project Management Institute (PMI).   Members of these three organizations fall into 
the same general labor categories that commonly make up the DoD acquisition workforce.  
To normalize the salary and bonus data, I used Consumer Price Indices (CPI) from the BLS 
website.4  Although slight inflation is typically the norm, the purchasing power of $1 actually 
increased marginally between 2008 and 2009, so the 2008 salary data are appropriately 
deflated. 
NCMA Survey 2008 
The NCMA produced a Salary Survey in 2008, and reported findings based upon 
usable responses from some 3,543 contracting professionals.  Of this sample, 
                                                
3 Allison named George Shultz, Donald Rumsfeld, Michael Blumenthal, Roy Ash, Lyman Hamilton, 
George Romney. 






approximately 56% were contractors to the federal government, 3% were employed by 
professional services firms, and 23% were federal employees.  Nearly half (47%) worked for 
very large organizations with annual revenues or budgets exceeding $501 million.  
Of the NCMA sample, 86% had attained at least an undergraduate degree; 45% had 
earned a graduate degree as well.  42% indicated they currently held professional 
certifications, such as DAWIA Levels I through III (26%), Certified Professional Contracts 
Manager (11%), and Certified Federal Contracts Manager (5%). Approximately half reported 
holding some level of security clearance.  More than two-thirds of the respondents resided 
on the East Coast or the West Coast, typically higher-cost areas.  The top cities in terms of 
median reported salary were San Jose, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC. 
As might be expected, salaries correlated positively with age, years of experience, 
educational level, clearances, professional certifications, and military experience.  
Interestingly, respondents from the very smallest companies (annual revenues or budget 
under $1 million) and from the very largest organizations (over $501 million) earned the 
highest median salaries.  Of the sample, the typical (median-salaried) male reported a salary 
$18,000 higher than the typical female’s salary.  This difference is likely attributable to 
differences in experience, education, organization size, and level of responsibility. 
Of all of the independent variables, the NCMA researchers identified position as 
having the strongest relationship to salary.  Specific positions reported most frequently were 
contract manager, supervisor, or director (31% total), and contract administrator or contract 
specialist (28%). 8% were contracting officers. No other job title was indicated by more than 
4% of respondents.  Lacking the complete NCMA dataset, the researcher made informed 
judgments on how titles mapped to the general job functions, reflected in Table 1. 
Table 1. Salary by Job Function 








Executive 152,000$       151,459$     4% 6,058$      
Attorney 140,000$       139,502$     1% 1,395$      
Manager 115,000$       114,591$     18% 20,626$    
Consultant 112,000$       111,602$     3% 3,348$      
Contract Mgr 108,000$       107,616$     15% 16,142$    
Subcontract Mgr 104,000$       103,630$     15% 15,544$    
Supervisor 99,800$         99,445$       16% 15,911$    
Staff (Contract Admin.) 76,700$         76,427$       28% 21,400$    
      Weighted Average, All Functions (TY09$) 100,425$   
In comparing median salaries of contractors to those of federal employees, 
pronounced differences were not found.  Contractors reported salaries approximately 2% 
higher than those of federal government employees.  Consultants (i.e., employees of 
professional services firms) earned considerably more; however, lacking complete data from 
the NCMA study, it was not clear whether these consultants were working with government 
or commercial clients. 
Table 2. Salary by Type of Employer 










Contractor to Government 56% 92,000$    91,673$     62,606$    
Federal Government 23% 90,000$    89,680$     25,154$    
Consultant 3% 100,000$  99,644$     3,646$      
      Weighted Average, Certain Employers (TY09$) 91,405$     
Analyses of other elements of compensation packages revealed compelling 
differences.  While nearly all respondents (96%) received some package of paid absences, 
92% were offered healthcare assistance, 90% were entitled to participate in a 401K or 
similar plan, 88% were eligible for life insurance, 85% were provided with dental care 
assistance, 75% qualified for vision care assistance, and 70% were afforded tuition 
assistance; other valuable benefits were bestowed upon smaller segments of the sample.  
Only 35% were entitled to a pension plan, 30% (contractors, consultants, and commercial-
business employees only) were offered ESOPs, and 64% were eligible for bonuses.  For the 
respondents eligible to receive bonuses, the median bonus was $3,500 (TY08$).  24% 
reported a bonus of $10,000 or more, 9% indicated a bonus of less than $1,000, and 3% 
indicated none.  Of respondents identified as executives (roughly 4% of the sample), the 
median bonus was $25,000 (TY08$).  Bonuses by percentile are shown in Table 3.   
Table 3. Bonuses for Contracting Professionals 
(NCMA Salary Survey, 2008) 
Bonuses  (normalized to TY09$) 
10th percentile  $           794  
25th percentile  $        1,589  
50th percentile  $        3,475  
75th percentile  $        9,631  
90th percentile  $      19,858  
Executives  $      24,822  
SCEA Survey 2005 
The most recent salary survey from SCEA was conducted in 2005, and reflected 
usable responses from 405 professionals.  Of this sample, approximately 78% were male 
and 22% were female.  Geographical data were expressed in terms of SCEA chapter 
affiliations; because 25% of respondents did not identify a specific chapter, the prevalence 
of respondents’ geographic locations could only be roughly estimated.  Approximately 42% 
of SCEA respondents were linked to either East Coast or West Coast chapters (typically in 
higher-cost areas).  Of the SCEA sample, 67% worked for private-sector companies and 
30% were government employees.  Of the government employees, 89% were civilians and 
11% were active-duty military personnel; of the military personnel, 92% were Air Force and 
8% were Navy.  For the private-sector respondents, no breakouts were provided on type or 
size of company. Instead, breakouts of primary end products were given. The greatest 
number of participants (30%) worked aircraft, missile and spacecraft production. The next-
largest category was research and consulting (24%), followed by electronics (11%), and 
intelligence/reconnaissance (7%). 
SCEA respondents were highly educated: 97% had attained an undergraduate 





professional certification.  Again, salaries correlated positively with age, years of experience, 
and educational level.  Of the sample, males generally reported significantly higher salaries 
than females, even within similar geographic areas and job functions.  For example, among 
the 65% of all respondents identified as cost estimators, males earned 16.5% more than 
females.  Disparities such as this are likely tied to differences in experience and 
responsibility levels: The typical (i.e., median) male respondent reported 19 years of 
experience, while the typical female reported 15 years.  The males were slightly more likely 
to shoulder supervisory responsibilities as well. 
Although the vast majority of SCEA participants were cost estimators, salary data 
were reported by several other types of professionals.  Program managers and financial 
managers comprised 10% and 11% of the sample, respectively.  Contracting and Earned 
Value Management (EVM) professionals reported the highest salaries, but collectively 
represented only 6% of the SCEA sample, as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Salary by Job Function 








% of Total 
Reporting 
Salaries
Earned Value Management 114,000$         125,229$     3.00% 0.0326087 4,084$         
Contracting 108,000$         118,638$     3.00% 0.0326087 3,869$         
Program Management 100,000$         109,850$     10.00% 0.10869565 11,940$       
Financial Management 94,450$           103,753$     11.00% 0.11956522 12,405$       
Cost Estimating 92,030$           101,095$     65.00% 0.70652174 71,426$       
Accounting & Other not reported not reported 0.00% - -$            
     Weighted Average, All Functions (TY09$) $103,723  
Overall, as was the case with the NCMA survey, the median salaries of SCEA’s 
private-sector employees were closely aligned with those of government employees, 
averaging about $107,000 (TY09$).  Interestingly, though, with increasing levels of 
experience, salaries of public-sector professionals greatly surpassed those of private-sector 
employees, as shown in Table 5.   
Table 5. Salary by Type of Employer and Years of Experience 
(SCEA National Survey Results, 2005) 
Employer & 
Experience Level Percentage <10 years
10 to 19 
years
20 to 29









Business 67% 71,500$    98,000$            98,000$           95,000$       98,000$       107,653$     
Government 30% 75,000$    97,000$            106,000$         108,000$     97,000$       106,554$      
Aside from base salary, the SCEA survey did not address any other aspects of 
compensation, such as bonuses and fringe benefits.   
PMI Survey 2007 
The Project Management Institute (PMI) released a salary survey in 2007, reflecting 
usable responses from some 1,143 professionals from the United States.  Of the PMI 
sample, approximately 65% were male and 35% were female.  Geographical data were not 
collected by specific location, but by type of locale.  Nearly two-thirds of respondents (65%) 





the remaining 4% worked in rural areas.  Of the PMI sample, 83% worked for private-sector 
companies; 9.5% were government employees; 7.5% were consultants.  Nearly half (44%) 
of the respondents worked for very large organizations (i.e., more than 10,000 employees).   
Of the PMI sample, 88% had attained at least an undergraduate degree; 44% 
possessed a graduate degree as well.  64% indicated that they held PMI’s professional 
certification.  As expected, salaries correlated positively with age, years of experience, level 
of education and certification.  PMI also mapped salaries to project size, project team size, 
and project budget, both of which positively correlated with salary.  Of the sample (65% 
male, 35% female), salaries for males were roughly 10% higher than those for females.  PMI 
respondents, not surprisingly, were predominantly project and program managers.  To 
ensure definitional consistency across the country, PMI detailed the functions for each title 
within the management hierarchy, and directed respondents to select the one most closely 
approximating their normal job duties, rather than reporting on a company-specific (or 
contract-specific) title currently held. For example, PMI (2007) distinguishes program 
manager from a project manager III as follows: A program manager coordinates multiple, 
interrelated projects in pursuit of a common operational objectives, while a top-level project 
manager oversees high-priority projects, involving extensive functional integration and 
considerable resources. 
Table 6. Salary by Standardized Job Title 
(PMI Salary Survey, 2007) 
Job Title Median Salary
Normalized 
to TY09$ % in Role
Chief Executive Officer 130,000$         134,511$     1% 1,295
Chief Information Officer 125,000$         129,338$     1% 1,471
Director of PMO 120,000$         124,164$     4% 5,323
Portfolio Manager 111,065$         114,919$     6% 6,535
Program Manager 105,500$         109,161$     22% 23,685
Consultant (Internal or External) 104,384$         108,006$     6% 6,709
Functional Manager  $         100,000  $     103,470 5% 4,888
Project Manager III 94,000$           97,262$       28% 26,975
Project Manager II 86,100$           89,088$       15% 13,172
Specialist (Scheduler, Cost Analyst) 84,500$           87,432$       4% 3,672
Project Manager I 82,750$           85,622$       8% 7,041
     Weighted Average, All Jobs $100,766  
Consistent with the preceding two surveys, PMI’s median-base salaries differed only 
slightly across sectors.  PMI collected salary data by industrial category; the categories 
typical of DoD contractors (information technology, aerospace, engineering, manufacturing, 
and telecommunications) are presented in Table 7.  As was the case with the NCMA survey 
results, consulting firms appeared to pay most generously; however, it was not possible to 
tell whether the consultants were doing business with the government or with other private 
companies. 
Table 7. Salary by Type of Employer 





Types of Employer Percentage
Percentage 




Consulting 8% 14% $111,500 $115,369 15,643$       
Aerospace 3% 5% $104,500 $108,126 5,498$         
Telecommunications 6% 10% $101,000 $104,505 10,628$       
Engineering 5% 8% $98,975 $102,410 8,679$         
Government 10% 17% $98,000 $101,401 17,187$       
Manufacturing 5% 8% $97,000 $100,366 8,506$         
Information Technology 22% 37% $93,000 $96,227 35,881$       
   Weighted Average, Certain Employers (TY09$) 102,021$     
Only on the aggregate level did the PMI survey address bonuses and other incentive 
pay.  Since PMI defined “total compensation” as salary plus bonuses, Table 8 displays the 
delta between total compensation and base salary for all United States respondents; these 
figures reflect all sectors and all job titles.  Because the mean figure can be distorted by 
outlying data (e.g., extremely high executive bonuses), the median (i.e., 50th percentile) 
figure will be used in subsequent comparisons. 
Table 8. Bonuses for Project Management Professionals 
(PMI Salary Survey, 2007) 
25th percentile 4,656$         
50th percentile 7,295$         
75th percentile 13,192$       
Mean 11,035$       
Bonuses  (normalized to TY09$)
 
Synthesis of Three Surveys 
The PMI, SCEA and NCMA surveys were selected because they focused upon the 
exact types of employees desired for this study (i.e., program managers, cost estimators, 
and contract managers).  As detailed in the preceding sections, the preponderance of 
participants in each of the respective surveys fell into those named categories.  Summarized 
in Table 9 are the median base salaries (TY09$), as reported for government organizations, 
consulting agencies, and the types of companies likely to be DoD contractors (e.g., 
aerospace, information technology, engineering, telecommunications, and manufacturing 
firms).  Since only certain types of employers were deemed of interest within each sample, 
the percentage columns do not always add up to 100.   
Table 9. Three-Survey Comparison of Base Salaries and Bonuses for Project 
Managers, Contracting Professionals, and Cost Estimators (TY09$) 
(PMI, 2007; SCEA, 2005; NCMA, 2008) 
Type of Employer % of Sample Med Salary % of Sample Med Salary % of Sample Med Salary
Contractor 41% $96,229 56% $91,673 67% $107,653
Government 10% $101,401 23% $89,680 30% $106,554
Consulting Firm 8% $115,369 3% $99,644 0%
Median Bonus $7,295 $3,475 n/a
PMI Survey NCMA Survey SCEA Survey
 
Clearly, these figures cast doubt on the common perception that government 





should be noted that, in each of the three samples, the percentage of contractor employees 
represented far exceeds that of government employees.  It could be inferred that fewer 
government employees belong to professional organizations, or that few feel compelled to 
report their salary data, since federal civilian and military pay data are publicly accessible.   
Moreover, more analysis is necessary to pinpoint compensation data on the 
expertise levels needed within each labor category to manage major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs).  To provide a more focused comparison of the compensation of a DoD 
contractor to DoD government (both military and civilian) employees, at the levels 





Table 10. Cross-Sector Comparison of Total Compensation for Employees Supporting 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (TY09$) 








Basic Pay 78,408 96,469 94,048 82,248 113,998 106,489 87,480 134,094 131,219
Bonus 0 1,300 4,205 0 1,400 4,761 0 1,500 5,867
Healthcare 12,000 6,900 6,900 12,000 6,900 6,900 12,000 6,900 6,900
Housing 22,884 0 0 24,948 0 0 25,200 0 0
Subsistence 2,676 0 0 2,676 0 0 2,676 0 0
Tax Savings 6,390 0 0 6,906 0 0 6,969 0 0
Retirement 3,920 4,823 3,292 4,112 5,700 3,727 4,374 6,705 4,593
Paid Absences 8,444 12,295 8,114 9,031 14,529 9,187 9,606 17,090 11,321
Total $130,803 $116,964 $113,267 $137,809 $136,827 $127,337 $143,931 $159,584 $155,306  
This chart captures the mix of acquisition personnel who typically support major DoD 
programs.  Given the complexities inherent to the MDAP environment, it was assumed that 
contractor capabilities would be at least equivalent to a project manager II or III (in PMI 
terms); the interpolation of that salary aligns closely with the weighted average ($94,048 in 
TY09$) of median contractor salaries reported by the NCMA, SCEA, and PMI.  Similarly, the 
median bonus mapped to an employee at that level reflects the weighted average ($4,205) 
of bonuses reported by the NCMA and PMI.  Within the MDAP framework, the second tier of 
contractor employee is equates to a program manager (in PMI terms).  Since the median 
program manager salary was 13.23% higher than the project manager II/III salary, 
commensurate adjustments were made to the salary and bonus at second level.  Similarly, 
the top tier of contractor employee aligns with an executive or a director (depending on the 
company).  Since that salary was typically 23.22% higher than a program manager salary, 
appropriate adjustments were made to the contractor salary and bonus at the top level.  
Support for this methodology was obtained through a series of personal interviews with both 
contractors and civilians affiliated with MDAPs in early 2010; more details are provided in 
forthcoming sections. 
For civilian salaries, all figures in Table 10 reflect base salaries at the midpoint of the 
grade level under consideration, augmented with the national average of 20.54% in locality 
pay.5  For the military pay computations, base salaries for officers with 14 years of 
experience were used.6  Military housing allowances7 for Minneapolis were chosen due to 
that metropolitan area’s similar cost of living; it most closely approximates the national 
average with 20.36% in locality pay.  The basic allowance for subsistence for all military 
officers is $223 per month.8  Because DoD payments of housing allowances and 
subsistence are not taxable, military personnel save approximately 25% of that combined 
amount on income taxes each year, relative to their civilian and contractor counterparts. 
                                                
5 Locality pay data (2009) are available at http://www.opm.gov/oca/09tables/indexGS.asp 
6 Military pay tables (2009) are available at 
http://www.dfas.mil/militarypay/militarypaytables/2009MilitaryPayTables.pdf 
7 Housing allowances (2009) are available at http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/perdiem/bah.html 






Valuation of non-monetary compensation involved making some assumptions.  For 
example, healthcare is provided free of charge to military personnel and their dependents.  
Assuming the total premium cost plus medical care would average $1,000 per month per 
family, the annual benefit to military families was assessed at $12,000.  While civilians and 
contractors generally receive assistance on healthcare premiums as well, the researcher 
assumed an out-of-pocket cost of $2,600 per year for insurance premiums and $2,500 per 
year for medical costs.  Accordingly, the valuation of the contractor and civilian-employee 
benefit was $6,900. 
For matters concerning retirement benefits, there are endless variations on their 
valuation and administration.  For the purposes of this analysis, however, a simple approach 
was used.  For civilians and military personnel, the full potential agency contribution, 
equating to 5% of annual salary, was used.  For industry employees, a notional company 
contribution of 3.5% was used.    
Crisp calculations of the value of paid absences were stymied by the methods of 
accounting for such benefits.  In the military model (a 24-hour, 7-day-per-week operational 
context), personnel are granted approximately 30 days off per year, but additional leave is 
sometimes authorized.  On the other hand, additional duty days are often required.  In this 
comparison, 25 days was chosen as representative of the leave utilized by military 
personnel.  Active-duty personnel are also entitled to unlimited sick leave; for this 
comparison, three days of sick leave per year was assumed.  For each of the three civilian 
grades, annual leave was valued at six hours per pay period (the level afforded to 
employees with fewer than 15 years of federal service).9  For the civilian grades, it was 
assumed that the average employee takes three days of sick leave annually.  Finally, 
federal holidays added 10 days per year to the paid-absence total for civilian and military 
personnel.  For paid absences in the private sector, a factor of 22 days per year (combined 
total of family/personal, sick leave, and federal holidays) was used. 
Qualitative Analysis: The Interviews  
To check the realism of these assumptions, while collecting qualitative data on the 
non-monetary factors that help retain high-quality personnel, I embarked upon more than 30 
in-depth interviews with both public- and private-sector managers during the months of 
February and March 2010.  My research study was publicized via Linkedin.com, a career-
oriented networking site,10 to several DoD-oriented groups, as well as through word of 
mouth to other colleagues.  Targeted participants were managers with a minimum of 15 
years of experience, working for at least two of the three types of employers (military, DoD 
civilian, or contractor).  My interview questions were designed to capture both sides of the 
principal-agent relationship.  After all, managers are familiar with both sides of that equation: 
They serve as principals on behalf of their organizations, but they perform as agents 
themselves.   
Interviewees were given read-ahead material, so that the interviews could be 
conducted within a 45-minute timeframe, either face-to-face or via telephone. Given time 
                                                
9 While most senior civilians have more than 15 years of service, it is probable that their program-office duties 
preclude the full use and enjoyment of leave benefits; accordingly, the figure used for comparison purposes was 
6 hours per biweekly pay period (or 19.5 days per year) of annual leave. 





constraints, I had to solicit input via e-mail in a few cases.  Lacking a two-way mechanism 
for clarification and feedback in those exceptional cases, the questionnaires that were 
delivered via e-mail were reviewed thoroughly for consistency and realism.  A few responses 
had to be discarded for reasons of inconsistency.  While the interview questions were 
standard, they could be altered in order to fully explore the interviewees’ knowledge areas.  
In very few situations, the focus remained on financial compensation; in most cases, the 
range of topics encompassed a host of other intangible inducements, including 
organizational culture. 
The interviews took place in a variety of venues—in the cushioned alcoves of briskly 
percolating cafes, under the harsh lighting of 1940s-era government facilities, in modern 
high-rise offices, in the lobbies of posh hotels, behind the closed doors of unused 
conference rooms, and in quiet corners of company cafeterias.  Due to my limited travel 
budget, however, just as many interviews were conducted via telephone—from my desk in 
northern Virginia, from telework centers, and from my kitchen table.   
Compensation, I affirmed at the beginning of each interview, is a term that extends 
well beyond figures on a paycheck.  Compensation can be understood as the complete 
package of rewards for work performed in support of an organization.  The total package 
may include ESOPs, profit-sharing, bonuses, tuition assistance, rewards for improving 
credentials, subsidized childcare, transportation or food service, healthcare, retirement 
contributions, life insurance, housing, subsistence, travel, and relocation assistance, as well 
as flexible working arrangements (hours, location, job-sharing), home-office equipment, car 
allowances, and reinforcements such as event tickets, gift cards, and free coffee, soda and 
snacks (reminders that the organization is constantly paying you back for your hard work).   
“Industry Pays More” … Or Does It? 
In the Washington metropolitan area, one manager stated, “Industry jobs are $155K 
and up.  With ‘tickets,’ you can command another $20K.  Since the DoD salary range is now 
around $30K to $155K, it simply cannot compete for people who are after high salaries.”  
Another manager corroborated this: “As a person with ‘tickets’ and certifications, I make 
$175K per year.”  One manager with visibility into salaries (both CONUS and OCONUS) 
stated that program manager salaries range from $120K and $150K, with clearances and 
professional certifications potentially adding $5K to $20K to the base salary.  Yet another 
interviewee acknowledged that “top-level program managers make $160-$200K.  Of course, 
higher-level positions pay much more, about $300K and up.”  A civilian manager with 
cognizance over contractors observed that “nearly all senior-level industry folks, with or 
without managerial duties, make more than $100K here.  The program managers I work with 
are pulling down $160K to $180K in base pay.”   
While most interviewees applauded the pay flexibilities offered by industry, not all 
were able to secure high salaries initially.  “When I retired (as an O-5) and interviewed with a 
DoD organization that used paybanding, they equated my rank to a GS-12 or 13.  I made a 
sacrifice in terms of earning power to work within DoD, but I did not stay there.”  Similarly, a 
former Army officer recalled questionable salary advice while transitioning.  “My counselor 
recommended scaling back my pay expectations, but I knew that the only way to something 
close to the salary I wanted was to ask for it!”  Other retirees mentioned trade-offs: “Since I 
didn’t need healthcare insurance, I traded those for a higher salary.”  “When I moved to 





company was very concerned about overhead rates, but high direct rates seemed to be 
okay.” 
“Non-taxable benefits are a big draw to me now. When first I left the military, I was 
shocked to see a large portion of my paycheck being taxed away.”  To attract contactors to 
support military operations in both hostile and non-hostile environments, one manager 
indicated that overseas employees were entitled to tax savings of $28,000 from non-taxable 
compensation.  
In industry, according to another manager, compensation is far more subjective. “I’ve 
seen salaries differing as much as 20% for people doing technically the same job.  I’ve seen 
vice presidents with almost a 100% difference in salary for the same job—at these higher 
levels, it comes down to this person’s contribution to the overall mission.  That’s hard to 
quantify because a lot of ‘soft’ assets—creativity, leadership and decision-making skills—
come into play.”  Another manager stressed that salaries for good people will be higher in 
industry than in government.  “You get what you pay for. If you have the good fortune to be 
able to hire the best people, do it! You can accomplish just as much with one great person 
as other companies can do with two or three average people.” 
Why, then, would a highly motivated performer want to work within the DoD?  Most 
of the interviewees pointed to the intrinsic rewards. “When I retired, I first worked as a 
contractor.  However, my leadership capabilities—those I had been refining throughout my 
entire military career—were just not used in that contractor role.”  Other retirees concurred. 
“It’s very hard, after being a key decision-maker, to just be an advisor, subservient to 
inexperienced program-office personnel who can easily dismiss my opinion.”  Another 
downside for military retirees joining private companies is that, in order to win business, they 
are often required to exploit relationships with people still working within the DoD. “The 
pressures that come with generating business are sometimes not worth the extra pay.”  
Bonuses and Awards 
Bonuses and awards, given their highly variable nature, are among the most 
interesting aspects of compensation.  One manager related that he had held positions with 
four different contractors, but had rarely heard of five-figure bonuses.   Another manager 
said that bonuses were relatively rare, but that everyone was eligible.  “Our bonuses are 
based on percentage of Award Fee dollars earned.  Our goal is to delight the customer, so 
our incentive is tied to that.”  Other managers revealed that bonuses are not typical: “Only 
the people who have invested at least 10 years with the company are eligible for bonuses.”  
“No one gets bonuses unless they’ve been with the company for a very long time.”  “In the 
companies I’ve worked with, the program manager did not get any special bonus.” “Only the 
most senior program managers get bonuses.” 
Other companies employed very different practices with respect to bonuses. “We 
notify employees at the beginning of their performance-assessment cycle of their eligibility.  
To get the bonus, there’s a range of compensation and goals/objectives to meet.  At the end 
of the cycle, feedback is provided, and a final payout decision is made.”  Another manager 
affirmed that “everyone is eligible for some type of bonus, based on our sector’s 
profitability.”  Still another stated, “Bonuses are based on project performance.  Meeting 
revenue and profit marks set by upper management constitutes half of the bonus, while the 
other half is subjectively determined by the direct supervisor.”  Another manager was 
pleasantly surprised: “I haven’t been with the company through the entire year, but I just 





bonuses are an expectation of all employees.” “Bonuses are a great retention tool, but have 
to be administered carefully.”  One manager uses multifaceted bonus structure, based on 
customer satisfaction, business development, collateral duties, and participation in morale-
building activities. 
On the government side, civilian bonuses depend less on performance than on the 
size of the organization’s pay pools.  “Under NSPS,” said one manager, “individuals could 
be rewarded more fully.  However, to many of my senior folks, being recognized as a ‘five’ 
(top of the scale) is more important than money.”  Another manager concurred: 
“Disappointments among my engineers tend not to center on the paltry bonuses, but on not 
being rated ‘outstanding.’ With limited bonuses to go around—and personnel rules tying the 
amount to the rating—not everyone can achieve that top rating.”  Yet another civilian 
manager confirmed that the small bonuses are not enough to influence behavior: “We’re 
usually talking about 1% of salary here.  The good part is that people know and understand 
this.”  Military officers, on the other hand, can obtain special pay for specific job duties, but 
are not eligible for bonuses.  Instead, officers are motivated by the potential of future 
promotions.  
When asked about group bonuses to reward collaborative efforts, only one 
interviewee had been part of an organization that gave out group bonuses, and they 
represented a very small percentage of the overall compensation strategy.  To encourage 
cohesiveness and teamwork, many of the managers bestowed non-monetary recognition 
upon groups, during periodic award ceremonies, through letters of recognition, and within 
the context of monthly project reviews. 
Salary Reviews  
When asked about the frequency and the impact of salary reviews, one civilian 
jokingly feigned confusion over the question.  “I do what I do, and by all accounts I do it well.  
Nothing ever changes my salary—except cost of living adjustments.”  Another civilian 
provided clarity: “Because DoD organizations have become fairly flat, many technical 
experts can only go so far.”  Others concurred: “For military and civilians, performance 
reviews exist, but salary reviews really do not.”   
Within industry, salaries are usually reviewed annually, or “upon negotiation for an 
increase.”  Said one manager: “Most companies have an out-of-cycle process for unique 
situations that require immediate address.”  Increases of 3% to 15% per year were reported, 
with the higher increases afforded to lower-salaried personnel.  Sometimes, though, pay 
increases do not keep up with the cost of living.  “This year, given economic concerns, our 
company elected to freeze all salaries over $100K.”  Another manager revealed, “Depending 
on the economy, we get a 3-5% pay bump.  But anyone who’s been in this business awhile 
knows that the best way to increase your income is to play the mercenary role: Move over 
and move up!  You don’t gain a whole lot in terms of earning potential by staying with the 
same company.” Others agreed: “Sometimes, the only way to boost compensation is to 
leave your current company for a higher bidder.  Accordingly, industry employees often have 
a better sense of their market value.  With that comes a drive to work harder and move 
forward.” 
One manager pointed to an unintentional seniority disincentive. “If the average pay 
increase for 15 years was 2% per year, while salaries for new hires increased at 2.2% per 
year, eventually you will have new hires making more than the old timers, since prevailing 





Such problems are solvable, given the flexibilities of contractor systems.  One manager 
touted the opportunity to really look out for people, where appropriate.  He has autonomy 
with salary decisions, but is also accountable for profits, losses, and customer satisfaction. 
“One time, an employee bargained for a 30% pay increase.  He was working on a cost-plus 
contract.  There’s no way I could ask the government to cover that, so I let him go and get 
that raise from another company.” 
Another manager reported conducting salary reviews after just six months for 
exceptional new hires, but emphasized that “salary reviews, by themselves, are not good 
retention tools.  Other things seem to matter a lot more.”  Clearly, retention of talent is not 
contingent solely upon economics.   
Other Aspects of Compensation: The Work Itself 
Fueled by technological advances, workplaces have fundamentally changed over the 
past decade.  Flexible working hours, mobile communication devices, and telework 
arrangements are largely taken for granted.  As such, they no longer hold great motivational 
power.  In 2010, the most frequently cited non-monetary forms of compensation centered 
upon aspects of the work itself.   A civilian pointed to travel opportunities. “My projects are all 
over the country, so I’m rarely stuck in my office for more than a few weeks at a time.” 
Another nodded to his colleagues. “They are well educated and motivated.  We don’t have 
to worry about back-stabbing from the inside!  Sure, there are politics everywhere, but here 
we don’t tend to have ‘camps’ and ‘cliques,’ as I’ve witnessed when I spend time at my 
contractors’ facilities.”  Other civilians concurred: “It’s definitely not Us versus Us.  Friction 
might fester between Us and Outsiders (e.g., Congress and resource sponsors), but this 
helps bolster that sense of shared mission. It keeps us together.”  
“My military career prepared me to move—had to go in, learn the ropes, and perform 
wherever I was sent.  Two or three years later, I had to pack up and do it all again.  To be 
successful, you needed agility of mind, and willingness to take on more responsibilities and 
manage risks.”  These experiences primed her for senior positions, which she found in the 
private sector, but has since moved back to the DoD, where she feels she can directly 
improve the livelihoods of soldiers and sailors.  Another retired officer emphasized intrinsic 
motivators. “After 20 years of leadership acculturation, I gravitate to positions where I am in 
charge.”  Having worked as a support contractor, “I couldn’t stop program offices from 
making bad decisions.  Now I can!”  Another retiree who has worked across sectors cited 
satisfaction in teaming with other strong female civilians, as well as people from diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds. “Opportunities for this are far greater within DoD than in the 
traditional white, male, upper-middleclass network found in industry.” 
A civilian manager stated that “many of my senior folks hold patents and doctorate 
degrees.  Accordingly, they command fairly high salaries, but that’s not why they work. They 
just love what they’re doing!”  Similar sentiments came from another civilian manager, for 
whom money is not a big motivator.  “I feel that I’m making a positive difference.  Every 
morning I wake up energized to go to work and do great things!” As highly credentialed 
professionals move through their careers, money may become less important.  A civilian 
manager mentioned cases in which senior systems engineers took $50-70K pay cuts to 
come back to the DoD. “They wanted ‘quality of life’ things—respectful working 
environments and manageable workloads.” 
Certainly, job satisfaction can be found outside of the DoD as well.  One industry 





in soldiers’ lives, because I was right there, giving them the tools they needed.”  For another, 
“in taking the reins of a small company, I was trusted to make decisions without constraints.  
Somehow, the stockholders knew that I would do the right thing!  My goals were simple—to 
grow the business and protect the employees from external shocks.”  A senior civilian 
agreed that “too many rules lead to managers becoming robotic—just going through the 
motions—people need some latitude to be creative problem solvers.” 
Managing the Blended Workforce: Different Norms, Different 
Expectations 
When queried about the relative ease of managing civilians versus contractors, most 
interviewees stated that contractors could be relied upon to deliver results within the 
timeframe allocated.  If managed astutely by a strong Contracting Officer’s Representative 
(COR), the contractor will have firm deliverables, a well-defined scope, and established 
schedules.  This is less common on the government side, where deliverable dates tend to 
be flexible, budgets are complex, scope is virtually unlimited, and schedules stretch for 
many years.  One civilian offered that contractors “don’t see the breadth of our 
responsibilities.  Whereas a contractor might provide great support in a well-defined area, 
we are all over the place—steering diverse projects and programs—managing enormous 
amounts of money over long timelines.”  An industry manager offered that “DoD civilians 
face tremendous administrative hurdles in getting things done.”   
“There’s definitely more motivation for contractors to perform,” said a manager with 
experience on both sides. “That’s due to a higher paycheck, supposedly.  But I think there’s 
more to it.  There’s more focus—and a greater sense of accountability.” This could stem 
from less job security.  “Industry projects are very time sensitive.  Failure to make budget or 
meet deadlines usually translates to dismissal,” said one manager.  “If you screw up, you 
are history,” said another. “We have to take calculated risks in order to make things 
happen,” another industry manager said.  “Out here, you’ve got to produce…and 
quickly…making decisions and meeting customer demands.”  Managers with experience on 
both sides agreed that there are many culture-driven expectations regarding employees’ 
work habits. “Uncompensated overtime in industry is normal.  I log about 10 extra hours per 
week, but that’s just what I do as a professional.”  On the civilian side, “There’s no 
expectation that anyone should work more than a 40-hour week.  In the working-capital 
environment, the norm of working no more than 80 hours per two-week pay period was 
especially pronounced, because labor accounting there had to be a lot more precise.”   
A civilian shared a different perspective.  “My Blackberry-equipped program 
managers are almost always on duty. I can send them a question any time of the night, and 
I’ll have an answer within the hour.”  Although managers from both sides were quick to note 
DoD civilians who personified dedication and commitment, the general thinking was that 
“Civilian workers are a little bit too secure.”  “It’s hard to fire them—there are no grave 
consequences when they mess up.”  “There’s more acceptance of mediocrity.”  Disturbingly, 
one manager pointed to “few incentives for departing DoD experts to share knowledge with 
the junior folks, who are discouraged when they are not being challenged.”  Civilian time-in-
service promotions are another irritant: “People can move all the way up to GS-13 without 
necessarily performing strongly.”  Two contractors expressed sadness over the repeal of 
NSPS.  “Government managers really need a ‘stick’ to keep people productive. (They need 





Broadly speaking, performance expectations for military personnel and industry 
workers were perceived as being higher than they are for civilians.  These differences are 
driven by job-security issues (on the industry side), and the ability to gain promotions in rank 
(on the military side).  Some observed that “the culture within industry is similar in some 
ways to active duty.  You do whatever it takes to get the job done.” A civilian manager 
disagreed, citing no significant differences in terms of responsibility or organizational 
expectations.  “As a program manager, I always had a counterpart on the industry side with 
similar duties and concerns.  We understood one another and worked well together.  
Whenever our respective organizations had differences, we let the attorneys duke it out and 
we continued our collaborative engineering!”  
 “There are no problems with the blended workforce, as long as there’s good 
leadership.”  A civilian manager agreed: “People are people—we should adopt a ‘colorless 
badge’ ethic.”  An industry manager confirmed that “values are embedded in people, 
regardless of where they work.  That’s what the DoD customer is really buying—great 
people, strong ethics, professional judgment.  Of course, there are lines that cannot be 
crossed.  We develop products for decision-makers to use—Independent Cost Estimates, 
Acquisition Plans, Performance Work Statements, etc.—but we cannot support a program 
that our company might eventually bid on.”   
Hiring, Firing and Everything in Between 
“No rational private company would institute a personnel system like ours,” 
confessed one civilian manager.  Most DoD organizations have a fixed number of billets, 
and cannot initiate ad hoc hiring actions.  Processes must be followed; attritions are not 
automatically backfilled.  Another manager admitted, “when I worked in the private sector, I 
appreciated the speed and smoothness with which human resources functions were carried 
out.”   
Several retired officers were repelled by the application process for DoD jobs. “So 
much documentation, so many narratives on knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs)—who 
actually reads this stuff?”  When applying for DoD jobs, “you upload documents to a ‘black 
hole’ of a database, and don’t hear anything for months!  I considered DoD when I retired, 
but I have to put bread on the table.  I can’t wait six months for a call.”  Radically different 
stories came from this industry side:  “All I did was post my resume on the NCMA website, 
and within days, I had 20 potential interviews.  The first inquiry came within hours!”   
 “We have lots of flexibility to recruit and retain…without a lot of hassle,” said one 
manager.  With this discretionary power, though, comes perceptions of reduced 
transparency. Another manager stressed, “We seem to have few standards on years of 
experience needed, or the value of degrees and certifications.  It’s very subjective, and 
when employees ask what they need to do in order to get promoted, I cannot offer much 
guidance, except to keep performing!” 
“On firing, our rules are obviously looser than DoD’s.  As a director, I could fire for 
cause (e.g., harassment) or for non-performance.  I could fire any of my direct reports on the 
spot for serious infractions (e.g., assault).”  As chronicled in the preceding section, many 
managers are concerned over difficulties in terminating non-performing civilians. “Deadwood 
does exist,” stated one. “Non-performers get shuffled around, but only rarely do we find a 
better fit that fixes the performance problem.”  “Unfortunately, the lack of productivity from 
poor performers puts more pressure on the civilians who do try to make things work,” a 





 Other examples of inflexible rules emerge when DoD civilians obtain attractive offers 
from other DoD organizations: The employing organization cannot respond.  “It’s hard to 
keep my best folks from being lured away,” said a senior manager.  “I must recruit very 
strategically, targeting, for instance, talent made available up by a Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC).” 
Proactive succession planning is also critical.  “We mentor all GS-14s and GS-15s,” 
said a civilian manager. “That way, no one feels singled out or neglected.  These are our 
senior folks—the ones next in line to lead.  Whether or not they get that promotion, they’re 
the ones running departments and divisions now, so they need to stay energized.”   
Mentoring younger workers is also key. “With Generation Y, the ‘thou shalt stay’ mentality is 
counterproductive.  We need to engage in enterprise-level thinking.  Every person needs to 
find the best environment in which to use their skills.  For some, it’s within DoD; for others, 
it’s with a DoD contractor.  By taking this broader view, we can encourage young people to 
find their own way, without stifling growth and confining them to stovepiped organizations.” 
Compensation, Culture and Contracts: Conclusion 
This study was conducted in two phases, which sometimes overlapped and required 
additional iterations. While the first phase involved gathering, normalizing and organizing the 
quantitative data, the second was aimed at gaining a richer understanding of the data via 
qualitative interviews with highly experienced managers.  My goal was to produce a 
balanced view of compensation practices, situated within particular organizational cultures, 
thereby infusing principal-agent theory with embeddedness theory.  From a sheer economic 
perspective, the compensation packages of DoD employees compare favorably with those 
of contractor employees.  However, flexibilities in contractor personnel systems open up 
possibilities for much higher earnings if an employee is willing to work hard, take risks, and 
deliver results.  From a more sociological perspective, retention of employees is aided by a 
positive, mission-focused culture, which can be created and sustained both in contractor 
and DoD organizations provided that strong, effective leaders are present.  In conclusion, to 
motivate strong performance,  organizations have a variety of tools from which to choose.  
These tools transcend base salary to encompass a shared sense of purpose, positive 
morale, leadership development, mentoring, and fresh ways of thinking about career 
progressions. When reinstituting the GS system, the DoD should fully leverage the 
management flexibilities and workforce incentives (toward these ends), as authorized by 
Congress. 
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